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Abstract 
The issue of CEEC migrations to the EU-15 is a continuous topic since the 
preparations of the 2004 enlargement. It is common acknowledged that all the EU-15 
members will benefit from the CEEC migration in a long term. However, the 
asymmetrical migrants will make the natives who are experiencing the high risk of 
unemployment more nervous and it is uneven to ask one country to afford the burden 
of enlargement. The thesis is focusing on the fears of the people in west members on 
the mass migration from the new members and its impact to the former.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The subject of the Study 
 
The enlargement in the first decade of the 21st century, happened in 2004 and finished 
in 2007, which was also the largest one throughout the history of the European Union 
(EU), made the EU the most influential regional organization all around the world. It 
admitted 12 new members to the Union, and nearly doubled the number of member 
states of the Union and increased more than 100 million populations. Another 
significant point of the enlargement is that most of the new member states are the 
former communist countries under the umbrella of the Soviet Union. After a process 
of more-than-10-years democratization and marketization, the Eastern European 
countries (except Malta and Cyprus) gradually get rid of the influence of Communism 
and catch up with the Copenhagen Criteria politically and economically. Although the 
process of accession negotiations of all these states was tough and lengthy, the EU 
finally gave them a hug. 
Thus it encourages us to explore what will happen in the EU after the 
enlargement. The rapid economic growth, the larger influence in the global society, 
and a stable regional security situation are among the dreams of what the people 
expect for a long time, which finally led to the integration of west and east. However, 
the expectations above could not remove the anxieties, among which the issue of 
immigration is the thorniest, that are common among all the EU-15 members. There 
are various explanations of the consequence of migration, while as a whole it may 
have more positive effect to the former EU members, which are suffering the 
problems of short of labor supply and aging for years. The labour mobility is the 
central feature of the international economy and a possible solution for the labour 
shortages in some European countries. “Moreover, the decline in the proportion of the 
population of working age may well increase these shortages, and migration, along 
with steps to raise participation rates among the existing population, is part of the 
answer” (Spencer 2002: P224).Yet, unlike the external immigrations, which could be 
restricted by national regulations, the people of the new member states are entitled 
under the Rome treaty to enter the EU-15 countries without any restriction in 
principle. “Freedom to live and work anywhere in the union is a  fundamental issue 
in the enlargement process, given the EU’s commitment to offer full membership to 
the Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEEC), not partial or second-class 
membership” (Grabbe, 2001: P143). It is a good signal to the CEEC people that they 
have the right to pursue better life freely, while it might be not as good as what it 
sounds to the people in the old members, since their jobs might be easily replaced by 
the formers. Now, 5 years after the enlargement, it is valuable to have a look at the 
situation of the EU-15 members and the impact of the east-to-west migrations on the 
labor market of them. The major issue of this thesis is the economic motivated 
migration from the CEEC to the EU-15 members. “Economic migrants who move 
from one place of work and residence to another, either within a country or across 
international boundaries, primarily because of their economic opportunities, as 
distinct from refugees and those who move because of the migration decisions of 
others (tied movers)” (Brettel & Hollifield, 2000: P61).  
In the following chapters, the author will analyze the wide spread controversy of 
migration inside the EU. The background of the east-to-west migration and its trend 
will be discussed below, as well as its economic, social and psychological 
consequences with the most recent evidences. First, the thesis recognizes the current 
research on the issue by both scholars and EU that the migration is positive and the 
fear of mass migration is exaggerated. Although the wage gaps between the west and 
east members are huge, the amount of migrants from the CEEC is far less than what 
the people expected. And consequently, the CEEC migration has positive economic 
effect throughout the Union. However, the author will argue afterwards: as the 
migration wave to the western countries is asymmetrical and the distribution of 
migrants is uneven (Kelo &Wachter, 2004:P83), the psychological impact is negative. 
Due to the geographic reasons, most CEEC migrants choose the countries lie on the 
borders of the EU-15 as their destinations. As a consequence, the latter countries face 
more pressure than their colleagues. The thesis will argue that it is not enough to 
analyze the issue only on the EU level and a case study of special countries is also 
needed. The last section will explore the reason why some countries insist on 
restricting the mobility of the movement of the CEEC workers. 
 
1.2 Research questions: 
 
The questions that will be answered in the thesis: 
1, What are the main characteristics of the CEEC migration? 
2, What is the impact of the CEEC migration to the labor market of the EU-15 
members? 
3, Why do some countries insist on restricting the CEEC migration? 
 
1.3 The use of theories  
 
Basically, the thesis is a combination of theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
existing issue of the internal migration within the EU context. However, it will benefit 
from theoretical reflecting. Theories are of value precisely since they structure all 
observations – it is impossible to make any statement on the social phenomena in a 
theoretical vacuum1. 
It is important to keep an eye on the causal elements of migration before making 
any hypotheses. In order to have a better understanding of the migration, the 
theoretical works on migration, and the economic and social elements of global 
migration, will be presented in the thesis.  
The push and pull theory, the neoclassical approach, the new economics of 
migration, the network theory and other related concepts and models are the main 
theories that will be discussed in the thesis. My motivation for the theoretical choice 
is backed up by the nature of the issue of migration. During the 20th century, the 
                                                        
1 Stamate, Gheorghe, European Security and Defence Policy, or Back to Political Realism?, 2004, P12, 
http://liu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:19849/FULLTEXT01 
migration from the less developed countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
became the main body of the global migration wave. Given migration has multiple 
variations, it is not enough to employ only one theory or the theories from certain 
perspective to explain the features of CEEC migration. It is necessary to employ both 
macro and micro theoretical works to have a comprehensive understanding of 
migration. 
The international migration has a long history since 15th century. However, not 
until the second half of 19th century, did the scholars start to explore the general 
reasons of human migration after centuries of historical research. From the second 
half of the last century, the research on the subject developed rapidly as a result of the 
fast developing international migration trend. As the concern of migration become 
more and more popular throughout the world, the scholars began to launch studies 
from the perspectives of demography, geography, sociology to explore the motive of 
migration. The neo-classical research on migration could be regarded as a milestone 
of study of the modern migration since a number of new concepts, models and 
frameworks have been created afterwards, such as the new economic migration theory, 
human capital theory, network theories etc, among which some are summaries based 
on positivism, some are explaining the phenomenon by studying the human activities, 
while others may analyze in a micro way. Notwithstanding, obviously, the variety of 
migration theories reflects the complexity of contemporary transnational migration. It 
is unrealistic to explain all the aspects of international migration in one theory 
comprehensively in that migration is evolving all the time. On the other hand, a 
clearer picture will be drawn out when we compare and combine the existing 
theoretical approaches. 
First, from the general perspective, migration has some kind of internal laws2. It 
                                                        
2 In the book of Ernst G. Ravenstein named “Laws of migration”, he concluded 11 laws of migration: (1) The 
majority of migrants go only a short distance; (2) Migration proceeds step by step; (3) Migrants going long 
distances generally go by preference to one of the great centres of commerce or industry; (4) Each current of 
migration produces a compensating counter current; (5) The natives of towns are less migratory than those of rural 
areas; (6) Females are more migratory than males within the Kingdom of their birth, but males more frequently 
venture beyond; (7) Most migrants are adults: families rarely migrate out of their county of birth; (8) Large towns 
grow more by migration than by natural increase; (9) Migration increases in volume as industries and commerce 
develop and transport improve; (10) The major direction of migration is from the agricultural areas to the centers 
of industry and commerce; (11) The major causes of migration are economic. (Grigg, 1977:P42-43) 
is the result of the interaction of a series of power, including “push” which forces 
people to leave and “pull” which attracts them to another place (Herberle, 1938). In 
other words, if the needs/desires of people cannot be satisfied within their current 
community, or being currently satisfied but hearing about better opportunities 
elsewhere, then the move may occur as an attractive alternative3. 
Second, from the macro level, the neoclassical theory, based on a large amount 
of trustful statistics, indicates that the economic motivated migration is predominant 
in the global context. It explains the general motivation of contemporary migration in 
the peaceful circumstance. In the post-Cold War Europe, where the political tension 
has dismissed, the economic demand raises to a new level. The neoclassical theory 
fits the situation of the CEEC migration after the enlargement and may give an 
economic explanation of the motivation of the migration wave. 
Notwithstanding, the neoclassical theory is weak in explaining the exact trend 
of migration. “Although traditional neoclassical economic analysis suggests a 
cost-benefits approach to international migration, the decision that comes from this 
model only applies  to the actual decision of whether or not to migrate based on the 
situation of the individual in question at a particular moment” (Smith, 1999: P1). 
“Decisions such as these are not made in a black box and it is necessary to examine 
the conditions that make up the individual situation; how these conditions are created 
by social, political, and geographic forces at local, national, and international levels” 
                                                        
3 The push and pull is listed as follows (Bogue, 1969:P753-54):  
Push factors: 
• A decline in the national economy of a country, or a severe downturn in an individual’s income level. 
• Political changes [that may be unwelcome or dangerous for an individual] in a country. 
• Greater educational opportunities. 
• Unemployment – inability to secure a permanent position or the unlikelihood of gaining such a position. 
• Alienation from the family [owing to changes in personal beliefs, mode of behaviour, or family feuding] or the 
wider community. 
• Changes in personal circumstances – marriage, ambition for self-improvement, better [perceived] employment 
opportunities elsewhere, etc. 
• Natural catastrophes – earthquake, floods, fire, drought, epidemics. 
Pull factors: 
• Better employment opportunities. 
• Self-improvement. 
• Better income. 
• Better climate. 
• Opportunities for career advancement. 
• Family relationships. 
• Appeal of new activities (cultural, recreational, and intellectual). 
(Massey et al. 1993: P432). The Decision of migration might be complex and painful 
to the migrants who will evaluate all the elements regard them. That is why the author 
employs the new economic migration theory to explain the scale/amount of the CEEC 
migration. It expends the neoclassical theory to the micro level and combines the 
micro personal elements with the macro economic factors. It indicates that the 
migration scale will be influenced by the economic variation as well as the social 
structure of the home country. 
Moreover, the neoclassical and new economic theories have the similar flew: 
the roles, including the migrants and the countries, are plain without any preferences. 
It is the recent theories that could explain migration in more detailed and micro ways. 
Among them, the network theory, which describes migration as a snowball effect, is 
valuable to explain the reason why most migrants converge to some specific countries 
to some extent. The author will introduce some other models in migration as well to 
supplement network theory.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The methodology design will fit the analysis and arguments of the whole thesis, 
which is generally descriptive and explanatory. The author will follow the qualitative 
research method by critically analyzing the existing research on the issue of the 
migration from CEEC to the EU-15 members.  
The current studies of both academic and official works on this subject will be 
reviewed. In doing so, the main theoretical approaches are discussed in order to 
explain the reasons of the features of the CEEC migration. First, as an activity of 
human being, global migration is far more complex than the scholars estimated since 
it follows the rules of movement of individuals as well as being influenced by the 
psychological elements. It is not enough to use only one or two theories in that any 
theory explores the issue from one specific perspective. To generate a common model 
of the trend of global migration, the thesis will overview different theories from 
economic and sociological aspects. 
Second, the thesis is a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. 
When analyzing the features of the migration, the author will firstly resort to 
theoretical approaches and test the results with empirical analysis. The strategy is 
based on the assumption that the CEEC migration is a part of the contemporary global 
migration trend that mostly happens under relatively peaceful situations. Thus the 
laws of migration in the global context could also be applied to the case of EU. 
The thesis also involves a case study of a member state. In order to figure out the 
reason of the restriction policy of EU-15, it is needed to carry out some case to 
explore it. Unlike the theoretical analysis, “The case study is useful for both 
generating and testing of hypotheses but is not limited to these research activities 
alone” (Flyvbjerg, 2006:P229). We could obtain information on unusual cases 
(Extreme/deviant cases), which can be especially problematic or especially good in a 
more closely defined sense (Flyvbjerg, 2006:P230). 
The reason to choose Germany to make a case study is backed up by more than 
one reason. Generally, among all the countries, the case of Germany is the most 
special, which fits the requirement to use information-oriented sample. First, it is 
more meaningful to study the situation of Germany since it has received a large 
portion of CEEC migrants (about 1/3). Second, comparing to other countries that have 
already abolished the restrictions, Germany, as well as Austria, are the last ones that 
still insist on restricting. Third, there is some internal struggle on opening to the 
CEEC or not in Germany that has existed for a long time. The struggle propels the 
country, which is not as stubborn as claimed, forwards step by step. 
However, it is important to notice that the amount of migrants is hard to estimate 
precisely, especially when the new member states join the Schengen Agreement, 
which allows the people to move freely in the Schengen area. Even the Commission 
could not hand out an exact number of the immigration and all the statistics that could 
be found now are mostly approximation. Due to different measurement, the numbers 
estimated by different ones may vary a lot. “For reasons of simplification, and as a  
consequence of the limited transferability to other times and places and finally due  
to the lack of data availability the macroeconomic migration specification remains 
rather ad hoc and poor in most of the models applied to the question of future  
East-West migration potential” (Straubhaar 2001:P168). That is the limitation of the 
thesis. 
 
1.5 The Plan of the Study 
 
The main body of the thesis will start off by introducing the context of the last 
enlargement in 2004 and the background of the CEEC migration. First, the 
background and process of the enlargement will be presented as well as the concern of 
migration before and after the enlargement and the related policies of the old member 
states. The author will then discuss the major features of the migration wave: The 
motivation of the migration, the amount of the migrants and the distribution among 
EU-15. Corresponded to the global migration, the internal migration of EU is also a 
form of economic movement, which means people, who are attracted by the high 
wage in other regions, leave home to pursue better life. While with the fast 
development of the CEEC, the desire of migration has dropped tremendously. The 
workers could chase their dreams of high quality life not only in the western countries, 
but also in their homeland. Moreover, the migration wave is asymmetrical throughout 
the Union, which means most people converge to more developed countries which are 
also not far from their hometown. Besides the empirical analysis, the thesis will 
explain the determinants from theoretical perspectives that influence the features. The 
section is to draw a general picture of the CEEC migration and have a short summary 
that the migration wave is economic motivated, moderate with a strong refluence, and 
uneven distributed. 
After the explanatory analysis of the migration, the paper will discuss the impact 
of it to the labor market of the EU-15. In short, the positive effect is from the 
economic perspective; while the negative one is about the social and psychological 
impact. First, rather than deteriorating the unemployment situation in the old member 
states, which is what the people there concern mostly, the CEEC workers enhance the 
competence of the native labor market and relieve the need of labor in some sections. 
It propels the economic demand in both the home and host countries. The points are 
both confirmed by scholars and the Commission. On the other hand, the author will 
argue that the asymmetrical migration breaks the current balance between the EU-15. 
The psychological impact is negative since people in the EU-15 afford more burdens 
after the enlargement. 
 In the next chapter, the thesis will discuss the reason why the EU-15 restrict the 
CEEC migration. The author will introduce the policies of the former at first and 
discuss the driving elements of them in restricting and opening. Moreover, the thesis 
will then present the case of Germany to analyze the impact of the CEEC migration 
from a national perspective. The reason to choose Germany to fulfill the case study is 
that it is still stubborn on its restriction policy to the migrants even though most of 
others have abolished the barriers. By studying the special feature of Germany in 
economy, society, the thesis will argue that it is for the consideration of high 
unemployment and the immigration situation, which is the current threat to the 
economy of Germany, that block Germany from overall opening.  
In conclusion, the author will argue that the restriction policy of Germany might 
not as strict as what people thought. Probably, it is a way to pacify the anxiety of 
German people/voters rather than a discriminative means to sort people into first and 
second class. As the further research of the thesis, the author will discuss the situation 
of the further enlargement especially if the candidates access to the Union. 
 
2 The feature of the CEEC migration 
 
Although the dream of European Integration becomes true in principle by the effort of 
generations, the newborn social and economic problems rise simultaneously. Despite 
of the 15 years rapid development, the economic gap between the old and new 
members remains tremendous in macro and micro aspects. The significant disparity 
could be a motive of mass migration from the Eastern European countries to the 
EU-15 members. “The wider process of EU enlargement has itself generated 
unpredicted and often unnoticed patterns of migration - some temporary, some 
permanent, and much of it circular or return in nature-that have little to do with the 
mass, one-way East-West migration feared at the beginning of the 1990s” (Favell & 
Hansen, 2002:P582). 
In this chapter, the background and process of the enlargement will be presented 
as well as the concern of migration before and after the enlargement and the related 
policies of the old member states. Next, the author will summarize the economic 
situation of the post-enlargement EU and the realistic motivation of the east-to-west 
migration. It is important to clarify that the massive migration wave did not happen 
and to specify the positive effect of the CEEC migration to the development of the 
EU-15 countries and the labor market of the latter. The thesis will analysis the 
migration trend from three aspects: the motivation of CEEC migration, the amount of 
migrants and the distribution of them of the host countries. First, the CEEC migration 
is driven by the economic gap between the old and new member states. Second, the 
wave, which has a deductive trend, is far less than what people estimated before the 
enlargement. This point is supported by the statistics before and after the enlargement 
and also confirmed by the scholars and the EU coincidently. Additionally, the 
distribution of migrants is uneven among EU-15: most of them converge into some 
specific countries. 
 
2.1 A Historical retrospection of the fifth enlargement  
 
Unlike the former enlargement, the EU (including ECC) was cautious to the most 
recent one that we talk in this paper due to the political and economic background. 
The first step could trace back to the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for 
Restructuring their Economies), created in 1989 with an aim to assist the ten 
Communist countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, which were admitted by the EU in 2004 and Bulgaria, 
Romania, admitted in 2007) to improve their capacity in economic transition. As a 
preparation of the enlargement, PHARE as well as ISPA (Instrument for Structural 
Policies for Pre-Accession) and SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for 
Agriculture and Rural Development) functioned successfully in both economy and 
society.  
From 1993 to 1997, the European Association Agreements (AA) between EU 
and the countries above, which issued their application for accession from 1994 to 
1996, were signed. In December 1997, the road map of eastern enlargement was 
drawn in Luxemburg and the schedule of negotiations between the EU and the 
Luxemburg Group (The leading EU candidate countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus) was decided.  
The negotiations with the Luxemburg Group began from Mar. 31, 1998, which 
marked the third period of the enlargement and followed by the negotiations between 
Helsinki Group (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta). The 
negotiations were held separated with different countries on 31 subjects, among which 
the most difficult were agriculture and regional policy. Of course, the process was not 
plain sailing, during which we could also hear the criticism from the candidates, since 
they are much eager than their negotiators on this issue4. 
“In December 2000, EU leaders concluded the Nice Treaty to pave the way for 
further EU enlargement, although it effectively set a limit of 27 member states. The 
Nice Treaty also set out internal, institutional reforms to allow an enlarged Union to 
function effectively. Critics argued, however, that the Nice Treaty established an even 
more complex decision making process. Thus, the EU embarked on a new reform 
effort” (Archick, 2008:P2). On Dec 13, 2002, it was announced at the meeting of the 
European Council in Copenhagen that the negotiations had come to the end and the 
accession of 10 new members to the EU would come into effect since May 1, 2004. In 
April 16, 2003, in Athens, the Treaty of Accession was signed by EU and new 
member states5. 
In December 2004, the EU concluded the accession negotiations with Bulgaria 
and Romania, and on January 1, 2007, these two nations formally joined the EU, 
                                                        
4 Luxembourg Group accuses EU of accession delays. 
http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/9139182-1.html 
5 EU welcomes 10 new members, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/04/30/eu.enlargement/index.html 
making the Union to 27 member states and completing the fifth enlargement, which is 
also the largest, since 1957. The addition of these two nations stretched the borders of 
the Union to the Black Sea and increased the population of the EU to over 490 million. 
Some restrictions in specific trade sectors remained in place for both countries, as did 
further oversight mechanisms with respect to judicial reforms and combating 
corruption..  
Finally, after 15 years waiting, to some countries 18 years, the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEEC) successfully grasped the key to the liberal world. 
The enlargement is a great chance to the development of the Union as well as a 
nirvana to the CEEC. The broad market on the east end of the EU could be a stimulus 
of the economy of the west and the better live condition on the other side also attracts 
the eyes of the people from the former.  
The fifth enlargement made the EU the largest economic unit (19.195 trillion US 
dollars in 2008) with a population of almost 500 million people. Simultaneously, a 
great Europe as what the founders foresaw becomes more and more significant in the 
global economy as well as politics. While internally, the fresh blood to the Union will 
promote the development of both the old and new members. 
To all the countries around the world that are facing economic reconstruction, 
plenty of investment is one of the most crucial elements. On this point, the EU has its 
special advantage. During the past 5 years, 27 European countries have formed a 
unified economic region in which the four freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of 
Rome will be largely fulfilled. People, capital, goods and services could move freely 
throughout the Union. “Economic freedom is the foundation for the utilization of 
trading advantages and specialization benefits that result from prospering European 
economy” (Sinn, 2002:P104). After more than 40 years of planned economy, the 
economic transition in all the 10 ex-communist countries, which are eager of the 
foreign investment and financial assistance, is painful. Now, the thirst of money could 
be partly solved after the accession of EU since the west money could enter the east 
freely in principal. It allows them to invest in the states above without hesitation. 
Moreover, not only the new members will benefit from the enlargement, but also 
the original EU-15. The broad market of 100 million people and the low labor cost in 
these countries are the best gifts to the former developed members. For the latter, the 
need of pursue low costing in Asia and Africa dropped a lot after 2004 in that they 
have a new choice in their near eastern neighbors where the relative stable political 
and social condition could guarantee the safety of their economic activities. In this 
context, the Nordic countries, for instance, “have done rather well in the face of 
tougher international competition” in that “the rise in Nordic living standards and the 
increase in Nordic welfare have been rooted in the openness of Nordic 
economies”(Vainio, 2001:P3). 
However, the end of the last era is the beginning of the next one and people will 
back to the reality when the night of celebration of accession ended. When the 
atmosphere calms down again, a new question hits us: What does the future look like? 
What will happen tomorrow? “Another aspect during the first years will be new 
immigration to the EU-15 from low-skilled but also highly skilled people, who both 
can help to solve the lack of labour force and bottlenecks on the EU labour market, in 
particular SMEs (small and medium size enterprises) facing difficulties in recruiting 
workforce” (UEAPME, 2003:P4). (UEAPME: Union Europeenne de l’Artisanat et 
des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises) 
The paper then will draw a general picture of the CEEC migration from both 
empirical and theoretical perspectives. It is necessary to figure out which features are 
the most significant ones since there might be several characteristics in a migration 
wave. To serve the research question of the impact of CEEC migration, the author will 
pick three to have in-depth study: the motivation of the migrants, the scale of the 
migration wave, and the distribution of migrants in the old member states. In the view 
point of the author, the motivation of migrants will largely determine their activities 
and the duration of stay in the host countries (The economic migrants will definitely 
stay longer than the crisis migrants and are much eager to find job). The amount of 
migrants will have great influence to the labor market (A larger scale of migration will 
certainly have larger impact to the labor market than the smaller ones). At last, the 
distribution of migrants will effect of attitudes of different host countries (The 
countries that have received more immigrants might differ from those that receive 
fewer in attitude and policies).  
 
2.2 The motivation of CEEC migrants 
 
Why do the CEEC workers leave home and march into the western countries? What is 
the motivation of them? There might be various types of migration, each of which 
may have different reasons. The migration in the war era may be driven by the hope 
of escaping war and danger, while the one that happens in the peace circumstance 
may because of personal reasons. In the post-enlargement EU, where the political 
conflict and tension have been replaced by European concert, the internal migration 
belongs to the latter which indicates that the personal interests will be the crucial 
element that propels the migration. 
 
2.2.1 Theoretical analysis 
 
Why will the CEEC people migrate? The neoclassical theory, which mainly focuses 
on the migration in the peace situation, indicates that the economic reason may be the 
determinant of motivation of migrants. 
The key concept of the neoclassical theory, which analyses the international 
migration from an economic perspective, is the labor resources. “The neoclassical 
cost-benefit analysis focuses on the individual facing a choice to migrate” (Smith 
1999: 2). The law of supply and demand in the classical economic theory is applied in 
the research of migration and they come to the conclusion that the move of labor is 
the result of the asymmetry of the distribution of global labor resources as well as the 
maximum of pursue of personal benefits. Todaro predicts that “migration occurs when 
the expected net present value of earning from migrating, weighted by the probability 
of employment in the destination country, is positive; and that migrants choose as 
their destination country the one with the largest wage premium net of transportation 
costs” (Moretti, 1999:P640).  
Both the micro structure factors and the personal choices will influence 
migration. First, in the macro level, the geographic distribution of the production 
factors in the global context is an element that will push and pull the migration. 
“Regions with a shortage of labour relative to capital are characterized by a high 
equilibrium wage, whereas regions with a large supply of labour relative to capital are 
faced with low equilibrium wages” (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999:P13). People in the 
more developed countries, which are lack of labor, have higher wages than that in the 
less developed ones which have plenty of labor resources. Thus the income gaps, 
which reflect the disparity of life and welfare between different countries, cause the 
migration. In other words, the disparity could be weakened by the flow of people, 
which will cease when it is solved. 
Second, in the micro level, the economic disparities between countries will drive 
individuals leave their homeland. The decision on migration is independent, freewill 
choice of a rational individual, who sets off after comparing the current and future 
status, calculating the cost-benefit and finally choose the destination where he could 
get the most profits. “The decision to migrate from rural to urban areas will be 
functionally related to two principal variables: (1) the urban-rural real income 
differential and (2) the probability of obtaining an urban job” (Todaro, 1969:P139). In 
the whole process, the prerequisite is the estimation of the payments and rewards: 
when the prospective earning is significantly higher than the spending on migration, it 
will come into effect. Rather, migration could be regarded as an investment of human 
capital: people will chase the maximum of personal interests. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical analysis 
 
In the EU, the following table may give us some information of the wage gap, which 
is an important concept in the neoclassical theory: 
 
Table 1: GDP per capita of EU countries (based on the International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook Database, Oct. 2008) (Unit: U.S. dollars.) 
Country (EU-15) 2008 Country (EU-12) 2008
Austria 52,159.18 Bulgaria 6,849.48
Belgium 49,430.28 Cyprus 32,194.93
Denmark 67,386.89 Czech Republic 21,040.64
Finland 54,577.85 Estonia 18,809.06
France 48,012.01 Hungary 16,343.32
Germany 46,498.66 Latvia 14,930.12
Greece 33,433.84 Lithuania 14,456.17
Republic of 
Ireland 64,659.90 Malta 20,743.60
Italy 40,449.60 Poland 14,892.80
Luxembourg 118,045.18 Romania 9,953.33
Netherlands 54,445.06 Slovak Republic 18,584.56
Portugal 24,031.24 Slovenia 28,328.22
Spain 36,970.46   
Sweden 55,623.77   
United Kingdom 45,681.00   
 
It is well know that the wage gap between EU-15 and EU-12 is large. And what 
we can see from Table 1 is that the gap in per head incomes between the two groups 
“is considerably wider than in past access rounds”6. Even the highest number of the 
eastern countries, Cyprus, just ranks at the bottom of the western line--- only a little 
higher than Portugal, while as the lowest of EU-12, Bulgaria equals to 1/4 of Portugal. 
The average level of the latter may be only 1/3 of the former and it is also necessary 
to notice that Poland and Romania, which have the largest population among the 
EU-12, have relatively lower GDP per capita. 
Besides the wage gap, the author will pay attention to the asymmetry of GDP 
amount in the EU, which represents the economic competence. The country that has 
larger GDP will definitely offer more job opportunities to the workers. 
 
Table 2: GDP amount of EU countries (based on the International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook Database, Oct. 2008) (Unit: Billions US dollars) 
Country (EU-15) 2008 Country (EU-12) 2008
Austria 432.404 Bulgaria 51.933
Belgium 530.613 Cyprus 25.585
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Denmark 369.583 Czech Republic 217.215
Finland 287.621 Estonia 25.207
France 2,978.12 Hungary 164.339
Germany 3,818.47 Latvia 33.902
Greece 373.516 Lithuania 48.747
Republic of 
Ireland 285.018 Malta 8.584
Italy 2,399.29 Poland 567.413
Luxembourg 57.609 Romania 213.891
Netherlands 909.465 Slovak Republic 100.569
Portugal 255.483 Slovenia 57.013
Spain 1,683.23   
Sweden 512.889   
United Kingdom 2,787.37   
 
Even though the new member states consist of almost half of the units of the EU 
and 20% of the population, the amount of GDP of the EU-12 only shares a smaller 
potion (7.89%, Table 2). The highest in the right line, Poland, is about 1/7 of the GDP 
of Germany. It is common that the workers might believe that they could obtain more 
chances in the countries in the left line since the larger economy means more jobs. 
Depending on the analysis above, it is the economic gap between the old and 
new member states that drives the CEEC workers to the EU-15 countries. However, 
the wage is not the only element in the issue. The migrants will estimate if they could 
really find a chance to pursue the high living standard. In other words, if the 
destination is only a small economy, no matter how high the wage there is, the 
migration scale will certainly not too large. In practice, the EU-15 might be an ideal 
target since the CEEC workers could have more opportunity than in their motherlands. 
Generally, the CEEC migration is an economic motivated wave. 
 
2.3 The amount of the migrants 
 
The study on this subject started to attract the attention of scholars ever since the 
beginning of the negotiation between the EU and the candidate states and it reached a 
peek around 2004, when the enlargement came to effect, while the concern on the 
issue dropped slowly afterwards. If the migration is only an economic activity 
predicted by the neoclassical theory, the amount of the migrants could be huge since 
the economic variation between the old and new member states is tremendous as we 
can see above. However, what is the fact? 
Nearly all the researches before 2004 have similar conclusions. In 2000, a report 
from the Commission, which urges the opening of EU-15 labor market from the very 
beginning of enlargement, show that the enlargement will not have serious impact on 
the employment and wages in the EU. As a response to the countries that will put 
restriction on the CEEC workers, who are expected to move to the EU-15 for higher 
wages and jobs, the study forecasted that “an annual inflow of 335,000 immigrants in 
the first years after enlargement, slowing to 150,000 by 2010”. Although the amount 
listed above seems to be a shock to the people’s eye, “even after 30 years of 
immigration from the east, in 2030 east Europeans will represent only 1.1% of the 
entire EU-15 population and 3.5 % of Germany’s” 7. “The most comprehensive study, 
assuming free access to the labour market from 2002 onwards, was done by a 
consortium of European economic research institutes in 2000 and projects that annual 
migration flows from the new 10 to the present EU-15 would amount to some 
330,000 persons in 2002, decreasing to 150,000 in 2012 and only 2,400 in 2030” 
(Jandl & Hofmann, 2004:P38). Moreover, “the latest update of this study 
commissioned by DG Employment estimated a net increase of migration from the 10 
new member states of initially 286,000 per year, increasing to 360,000 per year and 
falling to 100,000 by 2012” (Stacher, 2004:P5). The researches transmit such 
information that the western governments have no need to worry about the mass 
immigration from the CEEC. 
In addition, Michael Fertig predicted immigration flows from CEEC-10 to 
Germany from 1996 to 2015 in the medium convergence scenario (Appendix 1). “Due 
to the assumed convergence in per-capita-income the predicted immigration flows 
from these countries to Germany will decrease slowly over time” and “they amount to 
an average immigration number of roughly 67,101 per annum if the extension of the 
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free movement of worker regulation is assumed” (Fertig, 2001:P718). This is 
corresponded to the figure of the above (335,000 as a whole in the first years and 
decreasing gradually). “This leads to an accumulated increase in the stock of migrants 
from these countries in Germany by 1,409,119 persons within this time period” 
(including the 535,899 people from these countries living in Germany in 1995), while 
“not allowing for free movement from the accession candidates, as it is proposed by 
several politicians, would reduce this average immigration figure slightly to 66,740 
yielding an accumulated increase of 1,334,807 residents until 2015” (Fertig, 
2001:P719). He predicted that it is only a moderate increase of immigration to 
Germany especially for the first round accession candidates that is far too small to 
justify the large concern expressed in the media and the public (Fertig, 2001:P719). 
From his point of view, the restriction on free movement is largely useless since it has 
no substantial effect to decrease the immigration, as it is obvious that the difference 
between free-movement and no-free-movement is too small to be cared about. 
Besides, another element may also be taken into consideration. The birth rates in the 
CEE-10 countries declined remarkably in the early 1990s (Fertig, 2001: p717). As a 
result, the working aged people in these states will drop as well after the accession. 
Moreover, besides the research, the statistics of migration gives us similar 
information. In 2005, one year after the enlargement, “between 100,000 and 150,000 
people had moved to the older member states”8. It is even far less than what the 
commission estimated. 
 
2.3.1 Theoretical analysis 
 
It seems that the argument of neoclassical theory is not enough to explain the reality 
in the EU context. Although it is acknowledged that the economic diversity between 
the western and eastern blocs is huge, the amount of migration is far less than what 
people expect. The fear of massive migration wave is exaggerated since they are not 
coming. Given the individuals in the CEEC are rational and have free will, why do 
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they stay at home rather than moving abroad? We turn to the new economic migration 
theory for some further research. 
The new economy migration theory, adopted by Oded Stark and Edward Taylor, 
was developed based on the neoclassical theory. Besides acknowledging that 
migration is a rational choice, they treat the family rather than individuals as the main 
body. In the neoclassical theory, all the other elements besides labor market are 
assumed to be defect-free, well-functioning and meaningless to migration. However, 
the new economy theory insists that “choice of migrant destination is also influenced 
by the differential returns to human capital in internal and foreign labour markets” 
(Stark & Taylor, 1991:P1177). Moreover, the international migration is not only a 
means to maximize personal interest, but also a way to increase capital as well as 
decrease venture. “Households wisely pair their members with the labour markets in 
which the returns to their human capital are likely to be greatest” (Stark & Taylor, 
1991:P1177).  
Furthermore, the migration of a family member has further influence other than 
absolute income---the enhancement of the social status of the family should not be 
neglected. “If absolute income is controlled for, relatively deprived households are 
more likely to engage in international migration than are households more favorably 
situated in their village's income distribution” (Stark & Taylor, 1991:P1176). Rather, it 
is the international migration of a member of the family that gives the household a 
chance to get out from the humble status of their local community. In Stark’s research, 
the motive of migration is not the gap of absolute income between regions, but the 
“sense of relative deprivation” after comparing with other groups. “The decision by 
households to send migrants to foreign labor markets is influenced by their initial 
perceived relative deprivation…more relatively deprived households are more likely 
to send migrants to foreign labor markets than are less relatively deprived 
households” (Stark & Taylor, 1989:P4). In other words, people will be satisfied with 
their status quo in a slow-developing society; while when the society or the 
community changes drastically, the relative deprivation will generate among people 
since they could not help comparing themselves with others that were far lower than 
them originally but have much better lives now. Then migration becomes the most 
popular way to fill in the deprivation gap. Generally, the social structure also has 
influence on migration. The people in a society that has more uneven distribution and 
more serious relative poverty are more enthusiastic to migration. 
Thus it can be seen, the migration is more complex than what the economists 
hypothesized since it is not only an economic activity but also a social one. As a 
matter of fact, human is not only the simple slave of economy but also a complex of 
multiple factors. Given the ultimate goal of migration to pursue better life, it is 
necessary to introduce sociological, psychological analysis and other methods to 
research the human migration in addition to economic analysis. 
In macro level, the income gap between different countries/regions is the drive of 
migration in a large scale. However, as the decision of migration is made by 
family/individuals, their current situation, such as the social status, the satisfaction of 
life, is the micro factors. Migration is a result of the interaction of macro and micro 
factors and the scale of migration wave depends on how large the income scale is and 
how unsatisfied the people are. Theoretically, the people who possess sufficient 
earning and are pleased with their lives are least desired to move since the absolute 
income and the relative feeling are both satisfied. On the other hand, the individuals 
that are extreme poor and are at the bottom of the society are eagerest to change their 
status. The people between these two levels will hesitate on migration since the 
neither the push nor the pull is strong enough to persuade them to change their current 
status, so that whether they will migrate depends on their own situations. 
 
2.3.2 Empirical analysis 
 
Appendix 2 shows that the new member states have better growth trend than the old 
ones. Both of the two groups benefit from the enlargement and most of them reach 
higher growth rate after 2004 than before (But unfortunately, most of them dropped 
tremendously under the shock of the financial crisis). It tells us that the economic 
perspective of the CEEC is promising. To the people there, a rapid developing local 
economy is more realistic than the indefinite future in other regions since they will 
avoid possible difficulties in the latter. Concurrently, CEEC also need more 
intelligence resources to stimulus their economies and they have their own migration 
programmes attracting skilled workers abroad as well as natives. “Empirical  
research shows that the accession countries are not only the suppliers of labour to  
Western Europe but they themselves have become the centre of attraction to  
migrants, particularly for their Eastern European neighbors” (Biffl, 2001:P173).On 
the other hand, the low living cost in these countries may be another element that will 
persuade the workers to stay. Said by a Polish official in the negotiations of EU 
enlargement: “The idea of a mass exodus of Poles is nonsense. Some of us actually 
enjoy living at home” (Fertig, 2001:P719).  
Moreover, the enlargement entitled the CEEC, which are no longer the second 
citizens in the European and the global affairs, equal status to the EU-15 in the free 
world. The democratization of the former made them repossess their dignity and the 
freedom in global community, which are then strengthened by the enlargements of EU 
and NATO. The above change also decreases the sense of relative deprivation since 
the CEEC people are now equal to the people in EU-15 (at latest after 2011). It largely 
tunes down the desire of migration to the latter and the psychological push will 
disappear gradually in the future. “What we have learnt from the EU experience in the 
past is that if labour has the legal right to move freely, this makes people (especially 
in border areas) more mobile internationally, but it does not in itself induce mass 
migration from one country to another” (Straubhaar 2001:P169). 
As migration is resulted from a series of push and pull, the wave will come to a 
peak when both the powers of are strong, while it will drop when the powers recede. 
In Europe, the power of push is weakening because of the development of the 
economy in the CEEC which is a result of the elimination of dictatorship and the 
establishment of democracy. It means that the power of pull may be the only factor 
that will largely influence the migrants in the context of political improvement in 
CEEC and consequently the migration wave could not be as large as what happened 
in the Cold War that people are struggling for both lives and freedom. “With rising per 
capita income, enhanced social security systems and increased political and social  
stability, migration becomes less attractive” (Kraus & Schwager, 2003:P169). In a 
stable society, where people are relatively more satisfied with their lives, the 
migration desire is low. Thus, the trend of east-to-west migration will be mediate and 
digressive since the economic attraction of the EU-15 may decrease as the CEEC are 
rapid developing.  
Besides the study of the scale of migration, another feature of the CEEC workers 
should not be neglected: The wave of back home. 
The life of the eastern migrants is not as good as what they expected. “Economic 
migrants are described as tending, on average, to be more able, ambitious, aggressive, 
entrepreneurial, or otherwise more favorably selected than similar individuals who 
choose to remain in their place of origin” (Brettell & Hollifield, 2000:P61),however, 
the low class fields are their destinations probably. Even in the countries that do not 
put restrictions on labor market, the migrants are not capable to compete with the 
natives. The employment status will largely impair the desire of the migrants to stay 
in the western members. “According to stated intentions, a large number of potential 
migrants plan only short stays” (Kelo & Wachter, 2004:P82). Since the majority of the 
CEEC migrants may not be permanent settlers, their impact on EU-15 labor market 
will drop as well.  
Furthermore, as the home countries of the migrants, the eastern countries will 
lose five percent of population after the enlargement (Kelo &Wachter, 2004:P83). It is 
negative for them, which are also experiencing low birth rate (Mentioned in Fertig), 
since “a large share of the leaving population is young and thus still in their 
reproductive phase” (Kelo &Wachter, 2004:P83). Consequently, they try to woo their 
young back home to solve the problem of lack of skilled workers9. In these years, to 
attract the young who are seeking jobs difficultly in the western countries, the wages 
in Poland increased rapidly in the past years (10.5 percent) and the government also 
eased the procedure of starting their own businesses. The process of returning home is 
fastened in the shock of financial crisis and millions of Polish packed their baggage to 
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their hometown10. 
In summary, the migration wave is only a limited, moderate trend with a strong 
refluence. The amount of the migrants, which will pursue a permanent residence, only 
consist a minority of the total number so that the real impact of the migration flow 
will be more limited. 
 
2.4 The distribution of the CEEC migration 
 
It is noticed that the CEEC migrants will distributed unevenly among the EU-15 
(Kelo & Watcher, 2004:P81). By the end of 2006 there were 685,200 new CEEC 
nationals (i.e. the “accession eight” countries, without Cyprus and Malta –hereby 
referred to as EU8) employed in EU-15 of which 34% and 33.1% in the United 
Kingdom and Germany respectively. 11  (Denmark:4,800 (0,7% of the total EU8 
workforce working in EU15), Belgium:8,500 (1,2%),Germany:226,700 (33.1%), 
Greece:12,000 (1.7%), Spain:30,200 (4.4%), France:15,800 (2.3%), Ireland:47,000 
(6.9%), the Netherlands:9,200 (1.3%), Italy:30,000 (4.4%), Luxembourg:2,000 
(0.3%), Austria:50,400(7.4%), Portugal:200 (0.03%), Finland:6,600 (1%), 
Sweden:8,600 (1.3%), the United Kingdom: 233,200(34%)). 
 
2.4.1 Theoretical analysis 
 
It encourages the author to have a micro study of the CEEC migration. Where is the 
ideal destination for them? Before the empirical analysis, the thesis will be 
theoretically reflected by the review of network theory and some other models in 
migration. 
Network theory refers to the various connections that exist between the migrants 
and their relatives, friends in their hometown. It is the combination of a series of 
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interpersonal relations based on blood relationship, friendship. “After the migration of 
the first individual, the monetary and psychological costs of migration are 
substantially lowered for the relatives and friends of this individual in the original 
location” (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1999:P19). The work of Douglas Massey shows 
that those who have certain social relation with the migrants abroad are more possible 
to follow their tracks and will rely on the relationship between them and the 
successful experience of the migrants. “In effect, this decreases the costs of migrating 
and thus encourages immigration into countries with established communities of 
immigrants” (Massey et al., 1993: P449). The massive migration might generate 
migration network, which have influence on the people of the origin, who will make 
the migration wave larger unless the situation of their hometown have tremendous 
improvement. Moreover, “migration networks are powerful mechanisms that can 
countervail national and supranational laws and regulations” (Elrick & Ciobanu, 
2009:P113). From this view, the migration network is social capital to some extent, 
which spread the migration information broader and truer, gives the followers 
financial sponsor, accommodation convenience, and finally propels the transnational 
migration. 
In practice, the specific migration group in the developed countries will largely 
attract the people from the same cultural background and consequently the network 
will get more and more new blood. It will lead to a snow-ball effect, in which each 
person who moves to the destination countries holds social ties in their native 
countries, which may lead to gradually increasing migration. However, not all people 
from the home country are willing to move, so the snowball effect may stop at some 
point. 
Notwithstanding, the network may not work to the independent migrants who do 
not have any foreign social capital but are eager to move. For this group of people, the 
transportation cost of the first migration will be estimated more seriously. “This 
includes a calculation of the time or cost taken to overcome distance but also an 
analysis of social relations over time and space” (Kothari, 2002:P22). If migration is 
an economic activity as defined in the neoclassical theory, people will consider the 
benefit and the economic and social cost concurrently and the absolute profit will the 
major measurement. When the profit varies little in different countries, the cost will 
be the determinate factor. When the transportation cost is high, people in different 
regions tend to be self-sufficient and the disparity of wage will be neglected. It will 
lead to fewer labor flowing. However, when the cost is relatively low, the 
trans-regional economic activities will be more and more frequent and the gaps of 
income will be more outstanding and the hard to eliminate. It means the mobility of 
labor between nearby countries will be much larger than long-distance ones. It is 
because those who are not clear about the future will try to minimize the difficulties 
and loss. If the venture is a totally failure, they do not want to spend too much time 
and money on the way to home. 
However, with the developing of aviation and other transportations, the cost of 
the way dropped tremendously in the past decades so that the concern of 
transportation cost is only meaningful to the long-distance transcontinental migration, 
while the intercontinental flows will be seldom influenced by it. To the latter, the 
possible difficulties are more than transportation cost, the similarity of culture and 
language should be taken into consideration as well. Besides the beautiful, uncertain 
future, it is more significant to integrate into the target community as soon as possible. 
Even in an equal society without any discrimination, the language will be the largest 
barrier. And it is also a crucial factor to the migrants if they could get used to the 
custom of the new community. In practice, the closer the home and host countries are, 
more similar their languages and cultures are. It is more possible for people to move. 
It is related to the transportation cost hypothesis since both the two points concern the 
distance between countries. As listed in the laws of migration, “The majority of 
migrants go only a short distance”. In other words, people will move to their 
neighbors more often because of the economic and social conveniences. It is why the 
first wave of migration always flows to the nearby state when the network has not 
formed. 
Moreover, the migration policy of a country is another element that will 
influence the decision of the individuals. The migration friendly countries will 
certainly receive more migrants than the ones that have strict regulation on 
immigration. While, “restrictive migration policies are the main determinant of the 
limited migration flows and stocks that can be observed around the world” (Facchini 
& Mayda, 2008:P695). 
Based on the analysis above, the migration is not distributed evenly among all 
countries. Besides the economic elements, the political and social elements are also 
meaningful to affect the direction and flow of migration. The scale of migration to the 
destinations depends on the economic development, the connections between 
countries and the current amount of migrants in the hosts. And the population and 
social structure of the home countries are also important. The author will categorize 
these elements into two sorts: the economic one (wage, job opportunities, etc) and the 
conveniences (distance, culture, migration policy, etc). Obviously, Most of them will 
choose the countries having better economy or more conveniences and those who 
meet both of the criteria are more attractive to the migrants (Model 1). As a 
consequence, the migration is asymmetrical among different countries. 
 
Model 1: The attitude of migrants towards the countries with different conditions:  
 Better Economy Worse Economy 
More Conveniences High Medium 
Less Conveniences Medium Low 
     
2.4.2 Empirical analysis 
 
In EU, as the largest economies throughout the Union, Germany, France and UK will 
certainly be the first choices of the eastern migrants (The GDP of the three in 2008 are 
3,818 billion, 2,978 billion, 2,787 billion USD). In personal view, the GDP per capita 
of Luxemburg is the most attractive (118,045 USD), followed by Denmark and 
Ireland. However, to the economic motivated migrants, the small economies of the 
latter three means few opportunities despite the better earning. Therefore, they will 
make a compromise between the economy of a country and the personal earning. 
Then Germany and UK will be the best destinations since the GDP per capita of them 
also rank in the first half of the Union (about 117% of the average level of EU). 
In geography, Germany and Austria locate right at the eastern border of the 
EU-15, while the CEEC that locate next them are Poland, Czech and Hungary, which 
are the most populated among the eastern group (Poland 38 million, Czech and 
Hungary around 10 million). It is no surprise that the migrants will favor the former 
two members since the expending on the travel and the similarity of culture and 
language are the activator. Additionally, although Greece also has the transportation 
advantage, the worse economic condition and lower wage will make the workers to 
give up the idea of migrate to there. 
Furthermore, due to the geographic reason, a large network of Eastern European 
has already been formed in Germany. About 400 thousand Polish live there12. If take 
into account the migrants from the other CEEC countries, Germany has the largest 
number of CEEC migrants throughout the EU. The existing migration networks will 
pull more and more new comers especially the workers from Poland, which has the 
most population in the eastern part.  
 
Figure 1: Germany's foreign-born population by country of origin 
 
Moreover, the immigration policies of the EU-15 are also meaningful to the 
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CEEC workers. In spite of the economic and network advantages, the strict attitude 
towards east-to-west migration of Germany forced a number of migrants reconsider 
their original plan. While among the three countries that do not have apply any 
restrictions to the CEEC labors, the economy of UK may offer them the most job 
opportunities. Thus, the plan of seeking future in London is put on table. 
In summary, among all the EU-15 countries, Germany, along with UK, are the 
best choices of the CEEC migrants. Compared to other member states, the outstanding 
economy and the conveniences of former are the most important features that will 
attract the latter. 
According to the statistics, the preference of the geography to the CEEC workers 
and the uneven distribution of migrants are significant. Although the immigration 
regulation is restricted, the majority of workers still choose Germany and Austria as 
their destinations. While as the second economy of EU, the migrants to France are far 
less than to Ireland, which has a migration-friendly policy to them. It is hard to say if 
the CEEC workers do have impact to the labor market of France, Italy or Netherland, 
since the amount of migrants in these countries is only a too small portion of their 
population. However, to the countries that have accepted more CEEC labors, the 
asymmetry of migration will aggravate the existing dissatisfaction of the people. 
In short, the CEEC migration is economic motivated, moderate with a deductive 
trend, asymmetrically distributed wave. Will the CEEC workers, who will only 
consist a small part of the population of EU-15 and will not stay permanently, shock 
the labor market as what people feared before the enlargement? In the next chapter, 
the thesis will focus on the economic and psychological impact of the migration to the 
EU-15 countries. 
 
3 The impact to the EU-15 
 
“Without judging whether or not the following opinions are well-founded, many 
people in the West feel threatened, or at least burdened, by immigration in terms of its 
possible disruption of social systems, exacerbation of unemployment and threatening 
cultural conformity” (Drbohlav 1997: 87). However, does the CEEC migration really 
result in a raise of unemployment in the EU-15? 
 
3.1 The economic impact 
 
3.1.1 Theoretical analysis 
 
Theoretically, it is argued that immigration will have positive effect to the economy 
and labor market in general. “Economic theory predicts that migration enhances 
aggregate welfare in both, the home and the host countries” (Boeri & Brücker, 
2000:P15). Given that “immigration affects both aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply, most people would probably agree that extra (immigrant) workers in the 
economy would raise the supply potential of the economy” and the domestic rate of 
productivity growth could be raised by the immigration of higher-skilled workers 
(Blanchflower, 2007:P134-135). Additionally, immigrants are “extra consumers” and 
will raise “aggregate consumption demand”. Meanwhile, “immigrant labor could 
lower the natural rate of unemployment---the rate of unemployment that would exist 
in the absence of cyclical unemployment---by filling skill gaps or by tempering wage 
demands, as wage barginners become aware that they can be replaced more easily 
than in the past” (Blanchflower, 2007:P135). 
 
3.1.2 Empirical analysis 
 
Although the amount of CEEC workers may not be so large, it is still valuable to 
reinvigorate the EU-15 countries, which are facing the growing problem of population 
ageing, since they are the fresh blood to the old members.  
     
3.1.2.1 The impact to the labor gap  
 
It is argued that labor unions prefer permanent to temporary migration (Persin, 
2008:P851). Actually, it is astonishing that the labor unions in the United Kingdom on 
the side of the government when it declared not to limit the free movement of labor 
from the CEE members since traditionally labor unions would resist the opening of 
national labor market (Persin, 2008:P859). However, in an era of transnationalization 
of labor and the decreasing influence of labor unions, they have to “increase their 
influence on the labor market by recruiting and representing migrant populations” 
(Persin, 2008:P859). As a matter of fact, even the labor unions have realized the need 
of enhancing the competence of the national labor and consequently they favored “the 
entry of CEEC nationals into the labor market and accepted the general managed 
migration agenda of the government” without repeating the common topic such as 
“lower pressures, job loss, as well as the use of temporary migration as back door for 
permanent migration” (Persin, 2008:P859).  
It is necessary to acknowledge the positive economic effect of the CEEC 
migrants since it will propel the economy by filling the labor shortage. At the same 
time, the moderate migrants will increase the sense of job crisis of the natives and 
finally improve the quality of the labor market. “As long as there is a demand for 
workers, the market-based reasoning for integration allows that the European labour 
market can draw on labour from throughout the European Union and beyond, 
orienting its demands to geographically proximate countries found in the periphery of 
Europe and in the newly opened East” (Favell & Hansen, 2002: P586). 
Some scholars have further micro research focusing on one country or one group 
from the CEEC after 2004. Among them, Maria Brisan & Ramona Cucuruzan and 
John R. Dobson come to the similar conclusions that CEEC workers filled labor 
shortages for low paid, unskilled work. They have found that there is a paradox 
existing in the EU-15 states: the high unemployment and shortages in labor supply 
which has two levels including high-skilled and low-skilled (Brisan and Cucuruzan, 
2007:P19). Rather, the latter is not attractive to the natives of the EU-15 even without 
the immigrations. By conducting a questionnaire to the Romanian workers living in 
Spain, who are economic motivated, Brisan and Cucuruzan concluded that most 
Romanians have good education background (more than 80% respondents have high 
school education or higher) and the majority are working under their qualification (as 
65.2% respondents declared) (Brisan and Cucuruzan, 2007:P11-12). The situation is 
similar in the UK. “Contrary to popular argument, EU-8 immigration is not 
substantially combating the long-standing skills shortage problem. Instead, British 
employers are using CEE labor to fill shortages in low-paid and unskilled labor” 
(Dobson, 2009:P131). On the other hand, most CEEC workers concentrate in two 
sectors, construction and retail, hotels/restaurants; transport, in which the EU-10 
workers have a higher employment rate than nationals (CEC, 2006: P12). “Only in 
agriculture and manufacturing is the proportion of EU-8 workers significant (7 per 
cent and 2.5 per cent, respectively” (Gilpin et al., 2006, pp. 20-1)13. 
In general, the fear of massive wave is exaggerated and the migration does not 
create more unemployment to the natives. The amount of the immigrant from the 
CEEC could not shock the population structure of the EU-15 states, while the 
declining trend of immigration also supports their opinion. Furthermore, the change 
that happened in the structure of labor market of the old members shows positive. “At 
the most basic level, immigrants increase the supply of labour and help produce new 
goods and services” (Castles & Miller, 2003:P194).The immigrants fill in the vacant 
positions in lower level that is common among all the old members, which benefit 
from their arrival. “Since enlargement ... unemployment rates dropped significantly in 
almost all EU-8. This suggests that there is no reason to expect increased pressure to 
move outside EU-8 countries” (European Commission, 2006: P10). “Surely it would 
make more sense, and result in greater stability for all, if the EU would  quickly  
learn  to  trust  its new members, and  grasp  this opportunity  to put the goal 
of an area of freedom, security and justice truly into practice” (van Selm & Tsolakis, 
2004:P12). In recent years, the EU urged the EU-15 members to open their borders as 
soon as possible, all the while both official and academic reports are one the side of 
the Commission. “EU ministers have argued that Europe’s main threat no longer 
                                                        
13 Dobson, John R., Labour mobility and migration within the EU following the 2004 Central and East European 
enlargement, Employee Relations, vol 31, issue 2,2009, P133 
comes from the communist East but from behind a “new fault line” which has 
allegedly replaced the Iron Curtain” (Marfleet, 1998:P82). 
 
3.1.2.2 The impact to the employment  
 
The question if the CEEC migration will create unemployment might be one of the 
most concerns that puzzle the people in EU-15. The study of Tito Beori shows that 
“the Eastern enlargement of the EU is unlikely to significantly affect wages and 
employment in the current members of the EU” (Beori, 2001:P14). “Micro 
econometric exercises carried out in the context of our study suggest that an increase 
in the migrant share, in a given branch, by about one percentage point decreases 
average wages of natives by only 0.25 per cent in Austria and 0.6 per cent in the 
Germany. At the same time, the individual risk of dismissal increases by 0.8 
percentage points in the Austrian and by 0.2 percentage points in the German sample. 
The impact of migration on white collar workers is found in these regressions to be 
slightly positive or neutral. Since the increase in the share of foreigners from the 
CEECs-10 is expected to last for a relatively long time period, the impact of migration 
on wages and employment is likely to be rather moderate even in Austria and 
Germany” (Beori, 2001:P13-14). 
    As mentioned above, the CEEC migrants will only consist a small portion of 
population even in Germany and UK, which have received the majority of them. 
Although it amounts to 685,200 migrants, it is still far less than 1 percent of the whole 
working age population of EU-15 (In Appendix 3, it shows that the CEEC migrants is 
also far less than 1 per cent in almost all the EU-15 states). As a result it could have 
little impact to the wage and employment of old member states. “The impact of 
migration on the labour market performance of natives is much smaller than widely 
believed” (Beori, 2001:P13).  
Even having positive effects and little impact to the employment, why does some 
country still restrict the migration? With the analysis of the characteristics of Europe, 
the author will argue the asymmetry of the distribution of migration should not been 
neglected and the research on this subject should not only put an eye on the EU 
perspective, but also the national perspective. Besides the economic and social impact, 
a study of the psychological impact should is valuable. 
 
3.2 The psychological impact 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical analysis 
 
“Fear and suspicion of outsiders, or foreigners or immigrants in the lexicon of 
contemporary public discourse, is virtually as old as human society” (Messina & 
Lahav, 2006.373). The psychological influence may because of religious, economic 
and culture reasons and may result in anti-immigration. “Two of the major trends in 
the domestic politics of the major immigration-receiving countries since the early 
1970s or so have been the appearance and political advance of organized 
anti-immigrant groups, movements, and political parties” (Messina & Lahav, 
2006.373). The phenomenon that it is common among western world (even including 
some other countries) that the right wing, which claims nativism or anti-immigration, 
has been recognized by quite a percent of population reflects the sense of insecurity of 
natives to the increasing immigration. As analysis above, the coming of immigrants 
will increase the risk of unemployment to the natives even it is low. However, to some 
people, they would not assume the risk of dismissal and decrease of wage if there is 
no immigration. The scholars and public that pro immigration are mostly consider this 
issue from a micro perspective that people will benefit from immigration since it 
could propel the economy; while others, especially the low skilled workers that are 
facing high risk of unemployment, may resist immigration from their own interests. 
From their point of view, each immigrant, especially the economic motivated ones, 
such as the CEEC migrants as we discussed here, means they will lose the welfare 
that originally belongs to them. It is certainly harmful to their interest and will 
exaggerate their fear to the immigration 
Moreover, the attitudes towards immigration vary tremendously between 
countries. Given migration is unevenly distributed, it will be a snow-ball effect in the 
richer countries; while on the other hand, the margin between the better and worse 
economic countries in immigration will inflate. As a result, the people of the former 
will definitely assume higher risk of losing job than the latter and they will be more 
cautious on the issue of immigration. 
 
3.2.2 Empirical analysis 
 
3.2.2.1 The psychological unbalance 
 
Many researches compared the recent enlargement with the accession of Spain and 
Portugal in 1986, which also made the European Community fear about mass 
migration. At that time, “despite the economic differences between these countries 
and the richer  North, the expected mass migration did not occur” (Bauer and 
Zimmermann,1999:P1) and what is more important is that after 2 decades of 
development, the Iberia states become labor importing countries rather than exporting 
ones. However, the 2004 enlargement (including the 2007 enlargement) is more 
shocking by the sight since a bloc of 12 countries with 100 million population is not 
what the Iberia could compare with. The psychological impact of the former is far 
more tremendous than the latter. 
After about 10 years of silence, the EU-15 reached a relative balance in 
governments and public. However, the temporary balance was broken when 12 new 
members accessed the Union suddenly at almost the same time. It may take a little 
longer to rebuild a new balance in the enlarged Union since the new imbalance is 
complex.  
 “One of the problems of the eastern EU enlargement is the fiscal burden that 
will result when the existing assistance programmes are extending to the new EU 
citizens” (Sinn, 2002:105). Besides the investment from the old members, the new 
members rely on the financial aids of their western brothers to develop their 
economies. Although all the countries have same responsibility to the EU in principle, 
the fiscal contributions of the members vary tremendously. All the new member states 
(except Cyprus) benefit from the EU respectively, while the countries whose net 
benefit is negative are all the EU-15, among which the most is Germany (Table 4).The 
current budget will improve the development of the whole Union by eliminating the 
economic gaps and propel the European integration in a long term, it, however, will 
enrage quite a percent of public in that they are paying the expense of enlargement.  
 
Table 3: Open Europe estimates for EU-27 budget for 2007-2013 in euros (Billions)14
Member state Money from EU Money to EU Net benefit 
Belgium  39   33 +6.4 
Bulgaria  12  2.3  +9.7 
Czech Republic 31 9.2 +22 
Estonia    04 0.8 +3.2 
Greece    40 15 +25 
Hungary    32 8.4 +24 
Republic of Ireland 12 11 +0.6 
Latvia    06 1.4 +4.6 
Lithuania    09 1.7 +7.3 
Luxembourg    10 2.3 +7.7 
Malta    01 0.5 +0.5 
Poland    87 22 +65 
Portugal    29 12 +17 
Romania    32 7.2 +25 
Slovakia    14 3.5 +11 
Slovenia    06 3.1 +2.9 
Spain    78 76 +2.2 
Austria    10 19 -8,5 
Cyprus 01 1.1 -0.1 
Finland    09 13 -3.7 
France    89 140 -51 
Germany    78 164 -86 
Italy    70 116 -46 
Netherlands    13 37 -24 
Sweden    09 20 -11 
United Kingdom    46 103 -57 
 
Moreover, the fiscal share is not the only the burden of the EU-15, while the 
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uneven distribution of CEEC migrants adds fuel to the flames to some extent. CEEC 
migration is not the only wave that the EU-15 are dealing with. The outside migration 
from other continents especially Africa and Asia is increasing as well. The latter also 
follows the similar rule of the east-to-west migration that means most of the migrants 
flow to the most developed countries or the most convenient ones. In Appendix 3, the 
working age population from EU-10 in Germany and Austria may not be the largest 
portion; notwithstanding, the portion of nationals in them is the lowest (except 
Luxemburg) since the large portion of Non-EU migrants is influential. In this 
circumstance, the increase of any migrants, no matter where they come from, is 
sensitive to the people who are facing the risk of unemployment. From this view, the 
notion of European Identity is still under construction in that the EU-10 are still 
regarded as foreigners. 
 
3.2.2.2 Navitism 
 
While both EU-15 and EU-12 are very pro-EU, attitudes towards enlargement in the 
Union vary significantly. Although the overall support for enlargement in the EU 
reaches 46%; in Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg or the UK, the support 
ranges from 30% to 36%.15 Other studies show that racism is also on the rise in 
Europe16.  
Another meaningful phenomenon is that the right wings are dominated in the last 
elections in most Western Europe countries, Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark and 
the most well-know is Austria (Freedom Party of Austria). In fact, the anxiety of more 
immigration is growing in all EU-15 countries and the CEEC migration undoubtedly 
makes them more nervous. While the internal migration may not be as many as the 
external migration, its psychological impact to some countries will double when 
combining with other elements, the rather that it is an asymmetrical one.  
In general, the economic impact of the CEEC migration is positive, since it does 
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16 “Racism on the rise in Europe, new study says”, http://euobserver.com/851/22968 
not increase the unemployment in the EU-15, but propels the economy of the latter by 
filling in the lack of labor. However, in the psychological perspective, it is negative. 
Because of the absence of European identity, the CEEC migration is still regarded as 
external immigration by the old member states. It makes the nationals in the latter, 
who are experiencing the increasing immigration from other parts of the world, more 
anxious about their employment and welfare. It seems that the voice of the 
Commission from Brussels has little influence to the nationals of EU-15. To the 
governments of member states that should basically responsible to the nationals, their 
policy should firstly protect the interests of natives as well as their psychology. 
After analyzing the influence of the migration from economic and social 
perspective, the next chapter will start off by introducing the attitude of the EU-15 
towards CEEC workers. The thesis will discuss the issue of open the labor market or 
not and explore the reason why some countries insists on restricting the latter. 
 
4 The reaction of the EU-15---Why do they restrict? 
 
Certainly the issue of immigration from the east to the west is not a new one. The 
wave started ever since 1980s, when a number of people from the former countries 
escaped from the communist regimes for political reasons. Nevertheless, the concern 
of immigration is quite different from what it was two decades ago, since the eastern 
people could move freely without any restriction and discrimination throughout the 
Union under the principle of Rome treaty. In practice, this kind of anxiety was 
common ever since the beginning of the negotiation of enlargement. As responses to 
the concern of migration, all the governments of the EU-15 adopted various policies 
on labor market. After 5 years of transition, it is valuable to explore the situation of 
the labor market of the countries above and to evaluate the policies of them.  
 
4.1 The restriction policies of EU-15 
 
Due to concerns of mass migration from the new eastern members to the old EU-15, 
some transitional restrictions were put in place. Mobility within the EU-15 (including 
Cyprus) and within the new states (minus Cyprus) functioned as normal (although the 
new states had the right to impose restrictions on travel between them). Between the 
old and new states, transitional restrictions up to 2011 could be put in place, and EU 
workers still had a preferential right over non-EU workers in looking for jobs even if 
restrictions were placed upon their country. No restrictions were placed on Cyprus or 
Malta.17 The restrictions of each country are presented in the form below: 
 
Table 4: This overview of measures is originally based on a paper prepared by the 
European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), with additional research performed by 
EurActiv. 18
Countries Attitude 
Austria and Germany Transitional measures will be imposed not only as 
regards the free movement of workers but also against 
the freedom to provide services in selected 
(country-specific) sectors. The requirement for work 
permit will remain in force also for those citizens of 
new Member States who will seek to deliver services 
across the border and will want to bring their own 
employees along. In Austria, only those employees who 
have been legally employed in the country for more 
than 12 months (at the date of accession of their 
country to the EU) will be eligible to move freely. In 
Germany, the previously established bilateral 
employment quotas will remain in force for at least two 
years. Austria and Germany are expected to apply the 
longest possible 'transition period'. In the EU, labour 
costs are among the highest in Austria and Germany. 
Cyprus The Mediterranean island is exempted from the 
restrictions on labour mobility. 
Malta The citizens of Malta are free to work in any of the 
EU-15 countries. Meanwhile, the island nation of 
                                                        
17 The background introduction of restriction is cited from Wikipedia: 2004 enlargement of European Union. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004_enlargement_of_the_European_Union#Free_movement_issues 
18 The form is edited based on: EU-25: Member States grapple with the free labour market. 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-25-member-states-grapple-free-labour-market/article-117775 
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400,000 has the right to apply restrictions ('safeguard') 
on inbound labour migration for up to seven years 
The Netherlands During the enlargement negotiation phase, the Dutch 
government seemed to be inclined to refrain from 
imposing restrictions. However, in early 2004 the 
government decided to tighten its entry policies. The 
authorities have pledged to speed up work permit 
applications for employees from eight new Member 
States (minus Cyprus and Malta, as their citizens do not 
require a work permit). The fast-track procedure applies 
to those sectors of the Dutch labour market where a 
shortage of workforce has been identified. In these 
sectors the employers will not be obliged to furnish 
proof that a Dutch or EEA citizen could not be found to 
fill the vacancy. The Netherlands has also decided to 
consider tightening its entry policies if over 22,000 
workers per year arrived from the eight new Member 
States 
Finland Helsinki will continue to enforce 'transitional 
arrangements' for at least two years. The rule of thumb 
will be that work permits will be granted only if a 
Finnish national cannot be found to perform the given 
job. Cyprus and Malta will be exempted from the 
restrictions, and so will seasonal workers and students 
seeking to work part-time. Access to the labour market 
for EU-8 citizens will not be restricted if they reside in 
Finland for some purpose other than employment (ie 
entrepreneurs, family members of employees and 
students). Neither will the transition period legislation 
apply to those who have already lived and worked in 
Finland for more than a year or to new EU citizens who 
would be entitled to work if they were citizens of third 
countries. The 'transition arrangements' will not affect 
the free movement of labour within the framework of 
the freedom to provide services 
Denmark For at least two years, 'transitional arrangements' will 
be imposed. Only full-time workers will be entitled to a 
work permit, which will also be conditional on the 
granting by the Danish Immigration Office of an 
official residence permit. Citizens of Cyprus and Malta 
are subject to the same rule s that apply to other EU-15 
citizens. The employees from the EU-8 states will not 
have immediate access to the country's welfare 
schemes. The restrictions apply to wage-earners only - 
all EU-10 citizens are free to establish independent 
businesses in Denmark 
France Paris intends to maintain 'transitional arrangements' for 
five years (a minimum of two years) after enlargement. 
However, the procedures are expected to be flexible 
depending on the sector or region concerned. The 
restrictions apply to wage-earners only, while students, 
researchers, self-employed persons and service 
providers are exempted 
Spain Madrid will apply restrictions for a minimum of two 
years. Further details of the restrictions are 
forthcoming. 
Portugal By and large, Portugal is expected to follow in the 
footsteps of Spain. The Portuguese government has 
already set an annual limit of 6,500 on immigrant 
workers from all nationalities. 
Italy Italy will impose an immigration quota of 20,000 per 
year from the EU-8 (exceptions are Cyprus and Malta) 
Sweden The country will apply no restrictions on immigration 
from the EU-10 countries. The Swedish government 
expects to see around 10,000 job applicants from 
Eastern Europe (the respective figure was 6,000 in 2002 
and again in 2003). Under standing regulations, several 
hours of paid work are enough for an individual to be 
granted a work permit 
Czech Republic and Slovakia Workers from the EU-25 states will face no restrictions 
in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia 
Poland Warsaw will apply reciprocal measures, under which 
Poland will only allow Irish and British citizens to work 
freely in the country. The plan is for Poland to oblige 
citizens of the other EU-15 states to obtain a work 
permit (citizens of Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Sweden can expect easier terms, while people from 
Austria and Germany will face additional limits) 
Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg These Member States will apply restrictions for a 
minimum of two years. 
United Kingdom The UK will not be imposing 'transitional 
arrangements'. At the same time, the country will oblige 
immigrant workers to register with the Home Office 
under a new "Workers Registration Scheme" and to 
obtain a worker's registration certificate. Cyprus and 
Malta citizens are exempted. No restrictions will be 
placed on self-employed as well as family members of 
EU-8 nationals who already have the rights to work in 
the UK. However, EU-10 access to the UK's welfare 
benefits will remain limited 
Ireland Ireland will open up its labour market to the citizens of 
the EU-10 states 
Hungary Budapest will impose labour restrictions on a reciprocal 
basis over the whole seven-year period. The measures 
will not apply to the citizens of the EU-10 states 
 
The restriction policy of the EU-15 to the new member states is actually a breach of 
the principles of the EU. As a response, some CEEC also restrict the EU-15 workers 
to revenge. However, the point is confirmed by the EU and the former has the 
ultimate right to protect their labor market in at least 7 years. Whereas, how does the 
CEEC migration influence the EU-15 in the last 5 years? The following sections will 
analyze the post-enlargement situation from two perspectives: the scale of migrants 
and the employment status of them. 
According to the transition agreements, two years after the enlargement, (May 
2006), the Commission will publish a report on the migration levels from the eight 
new member countries and the impacts on the labour markets of the old member 
states. Following that report, the EU-15 will have the option to choose either to open 
up their labour markets and their welfare system completely or keep the limitations.  
In May 2009, the old member states are expected to open up their labour markets 
completely. They are allowed to maintain the restrictions for two more years in case 
they can demonstrate serious threats or infringements. In May 2011, exactly seven 
years after the enlargement, all member states must open up their labour markets to 
the citizens of other member states. In case a country foresees no problems with 
opening up their labour market, it may lift the restrictions even before the first formal 
opportunity of removal in 200619. This means that they can “decide to go further than 
others in opening their labour markets, according to local needs and circumstances” 
(Leonard, 2001:P3).  
However, despite of a number of voices of the positive immigration, the western 
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countries are still reluctant to do so as what happened when the Iberia entered the 
Union in middle 1980s. Only 3 countries are willing to accept the CEE workers 
without any restriction from the very beginning, while others followed those three 
step by step. Until 2008, when France finally lifted its barrier to the CEE countries on 
labor market 6 months earlier than expected, as a response to assume the EU's 
six-month rotating presidency. Austria and Germany, are the only two members which 
still insist their protection policy. “As it has been pointed out by many observers, the 
migration restrictions currently in place cannot be explained within a purely economic, 
welfare-maximizing framework. Political economy factors – shaped by both 
economic and non-economic drivers – are crucial to understand migration policy 
outcomes” (Facchini & Mayda, 2008:P695). Thus, it encourages the author to explore 
the reason why some countries are so stubborn on themselves regardless of the claim 
of free movement external and internal20.  
 
4.2 Theoretical analysis 
 
It is interesting that the EU-15, which are lack of labor because of an aging population 
and low birth rate, still restrict the CEEC workers. It encourages the author to figure 
out the reason of the restriction policy. 
Generally, the restriction of immigration is also a form of immigration regulation, 
which is common among all the countries around world. Even the most 
immigration-friendly countries are not open to all applicants since “one of the most 
pressing challenges for many countries today is therefore to find ways of coping with 
“unwanted21” migratory flows” (Castles & Miller, 2003:P282).  
The skilled worker, which is already some kind of scarce resource, is what all the 
countries competing for. All the western countries have relatively looser regulation for 
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http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2717289,00.html 
21 Unwanted immigration refers to(Castles & Miller, 2003:P283): 
Illegal border-crossers; 
Legal entrants who overstay their entry visas or who work without permission 
Family members of migrant workers, prevented from entering legally by restrictions on family reunion 
Asylum seekers not regarded as genuine refugees. 
the skilled labors in order to attract the latter to fill in the gap of skill. While to the 
low skilled workers, which is also internal problem to the host countries, the 
regulations are rigid. “Most such migrants come from poor countries and seek 
employment, but generally lack work qualifications. They compete with 
disadvantaged local people for unskilled jobs, and for housing and social amenities” 
(Castles & Miller, 2003:P283). The unwanted immigrants (the low-skilled/unqualified 
workers) will increase the unemployment of the unskilled local people and deteriorate 
their fear of immigration as we analysed above. What is more, it is meaningless to the 
skill gap of the developed countries. Consequently, besides encouraging legal 
immigration, “stopping unwanted immigration is increasing regarded by governments 
as essential for safeguarding social peace” (Castles & Miller, 2003:P283). 
 
4.3 Empirical analysis--Why does Germany still restrict? 
 
The Commission urges the countries to abolish the barrier of free movement of people 
annually, however, it seems meaningless to Germany. Why does Germany so stubborn 
on its restriction policy? In this section, the author will explore the consideration of 
the German government on the CEEC migration and figure out the “threats” and 
“infringements” to Germany. 
 
4.3.1 Unemployment 
 
The reason why the EU-15 fear of eastern migration flow is most related to their 
employment situation. In Table 5, the first three members (Ireland, Sweden and UK) 
that opened their labor market in 2004 has relative lower unemployment rate. 
Although they are not the lowest unemployed economies, they are quite lower than 
the average level of the EU-15 (8% in 200322). It made them confident to welcome 
the CEEC workers since the potential migrants might not trigger employment crisis. 
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Certainly, not all the lower unemployment rated countries were brave to stand along 
with the first three, Netherlands, Denmark as well as Luxemburg were cautious so 
that they had restrictions with others; however, the higher unemployed members were 
all strict on the issue. Among them, Germany is unlucky one of the highest.  
After 5 years of running-in, the unemployment decreased year after year in all 
the EU-15. On the other hand, as analyzed above, the eastern migrants are too few to 
challenge the nationals in the west countries so that it is needless to put restrictions 
again. Nevertheless, in spite of 3 point of reduction in unemployment rate, Germany 
is still among the highest in the west bloc. 
 
Table 5: Unemployment rate of EU-15 (Unit: percentage) (Based on International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008) 
Country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 4.292 4.792 5.167 4.75 4.408 3.833
Belgium 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.3 7.5 6.804
Denmark 5.707 5.832 5.116 3.927 2.65 1.725
Finland 9.038 8.828 8.359 7.704 6.841 6.363
France 8.967 9.225 9.275 9.225 8.283 7.787
Germany 9.308 9.775 10.608 9.825 8.383 7.296
Greece 9.725 10.5 9.85 8.9 8.3 7.647
Ireland 4.653 4.456 4.386 4.428 4.532 6.121
Italy 8.45 8.05 7.725 6.8 6.125 6.75
Luxembourg 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.371
Netherlands 3.692 4.583 4.717 3.917 3.211 2.819
Portugal 6.27 6.651 7.617 7.658 7.985 7.801
Spain 11.48 10.97 9.16 8.513 8.263 11.325
Sweden 5.617 6.333 7.633 7.042 6.117 6.167
United Kingdom 5.045 4.783 4.791 5.392 5.397 5.548
 
Obviously, it is the high unemployment situation that hinders Germany from 
fully opening its labor market. Moreover, Germany is the most populated member 
states of EU. It means although Germany is not the highest rated unemployed, it has 
the most unemployed people throughout the Union. Furthermore, another special 
feature of Germany is the uneven development between west and east border of the 
country after re-unification in 1990. Despite the capital injection, the East's 
unemployment rate is still 18.6% - in many regions it tops 25%23. The double 
unemployment dilemma is the most serious challenge to the German government and 
the CEEC workers might worsen the existing problem and the discontent of the 
public.  
Along with other member states, Germany eased the regulation on CEEC 
workers in the second stage of the transition period. In 2007, Germany granted easy 
access to the German labor market for electrical and mechanical engineers and 
reduced the minimum annual wage requirements to obtain a work visa for 
non-EU/EEA workers24. It was not a complete plan to abolish the restrictions totally; 
however, it was a step forward.  
On the other hand, it is because Germany received a large percent of CEEC 
migrants that makes the other members feel little pressure. If all member states were 
restriction free to the CEEC migrants at the very beginning, the distribution of them 
could be more asymmetrical.  
Shortly, even with the restrictions, Germany still offers more opportunities than 
other EU-15 states. If all the old members open their labor markets from the very 
beginning, it is inevitable that the migrants flow to Germany will exceed the number 
in UK. Given the migration is the only convenience of UK, the workers moved to 
London might decline if Germany is also fully opened since it is of more convenience 
than the former in geography, culture and network; consequently, the asymmetry of 
migration distribution would be more serious. It is reasonable for the Germany 
government to have such a rule to decrease its attraction to the CEEC workers and 
pacify the nationals, or the current internal imbalance will be intensified by the 
eastern labors. 
 
4.3.2 Immigration situation 
 
                                                        
23 Waiting for the East to flourish, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4225346.stm 
24 Germany eases restrictions for new EU states, foreign students, 
http://www.workpermit.com/news/2007-08-25/germany/germany-new-eu-engineers-allowed-to-work-graduates-th
ree-years.htm 
As a non-immigration country, Germany has a long tradition of strict immigration 
policy. Not until 2002 did the country have its first immigration law. Before that, 
“Labour (or economic) immigration has been officially ‘banned’ since 1973. Hence, 
from the oil crisis onward, immigration for working purposes, especially with regards 
to permanent immigration, did not constitute a separate area of competence”25. On the 
other hand, although criticized by other countries because of the rigid immigration 
law26, Germany, which has the largest foreigner ethnic group in the EU, has received 
15.3 million immigrants, which “accounts for 19% of the total population, 9% of 
whom are foreigners and 10% German citizens”27: Germany is undoubtedly an 
“immigration country”. 
Even with a high threshold of immigration, Germany is still the most attractive 
destination among EU to the migrants. It is rational for the Germany government to 
restrict the CEEC workers since it is a part of the immigration policy of the country. 
Unlike the external migrants from other continents, the right of free movement of the 
CEEC citizens is what the German people fear mostly.  
However, Germany, which is attractive to the immigrants, is also experiencing a 
“Brain Drain”, which means that Germany is losing high qualified labors year after 
year. The number of emigrants increased from 145,000 in 2005 to 155,290 people in 
200628. What is more, the most alarming aspect of the news is that more than half of 
the emigrants are younger than 3529. The high unemployment rate, the high tax and 
the weak economic performance force more and more high qualified workers move to 
Switzerland and US for new lives30. There is no question, though, that Germany must 
learn to attract and retain the highly skilled, whether German or foreign.  
                                                        
25 Is Ignorance Really Bliss? Germany’s Labour Migration Policy, 
http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2004/migration/pt1/germanylabour 
26 Language Requirement 'Against Human Rights', 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,475839,00.html 
27 Germans and foreigners with an immigrant background, 
http://www.en.bmi.bund.de/nn_148248/Internet/Content/Themen/Auslaender__Fluechtlinge__Asyl__Zuwanderun
g/DatenundFakten/Deutsche__Auslaender__mit__Migrationshintergrund__en.html 
28 German brain drain at highest level since 1940s, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/german-brain-drain-at-highest-level-since-1940s-451250.html 
29 Experts Warn German 'Brain Drain' Is Reaching New Heights, 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,2212913,00.html 
30 New Research Challenges Notion of German "Brain Drain", 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=328 
Yet, the structure of the immigrants is not satisfactory. “The federal government 
turned down proposals to make it easier for talented foreigners to work in Germany. 
Only 138 people defined as "highly qualified"--such as engineers and 
entrepreneurs--settled in Germany in the first quarter of this year, out of a total inflow 
of 123,000 foreigners”31. It is argued that most “individuals from countries with free 
labour movement agreements with Germany show a considerably higher likelihood of 
leaving Germany”, however, the low skilled migrants are more likely to stay longer to 
pursue permanent residence than the higher skilled (Gundel & Peters, 2008:P769). 
The phenomenon that higher skilled workers (both natives and migrants) are not 
willing to stay, while the low skilled migrants (who might to purse a permanent stay) 
will increase gradually, will change the structure of the labor market: the upper half of 
the pyramid will decrease while the lower half will inflate. The labor structure and the 
migration composition might be the threat and infringement to Germany. “In this 
sense, it is crucial to reduce out-migration of highly qualified individuals” (Gundel & 
Peters, 2008:P779). In practice, the new released policy made the skilled workers 
from CEEC much easier to settle down. It is a step forwards which gives attention to 
both the national interests and the responsibility of the Union.  
On this view, it is not only the unemployment situation, but also the composition 
of the migration wave and the structure of their labor market that hinders Germany, 
which has received a large portion of CEEC workers, from accomplishing the 
enlargement. To Germany, it is necessary to refresh the economy before opening the 
labor market completely. To a county that have more contribution and sacrifice to the 
EU, it is considerate to give Germany a little privilege when it is facing more 
difficulties than other member states.  
The restriction is not a regulation to block immigration, but a policy to pacify the 
nationals that fear of unemployment and immigration. What is more, Germany is not 
hostile to the CEEC workers since the labor market is opened step by step. The 
German government gives the foreign students 3 years work permit after graduation 
                                                        
31 Europe: Auf wiedersehen, Fatherland; Germany: land of emigration, The Economist, vol 381, issue 8501, 2006, 
pp54.
from college32. It is an alternative way to soften the regulation. In fact, the Germany 
government is friendly to the CEEC labors in a cautious way. The gradually eased 
regulation reflects that Germany hopes to reduce the venture in the transition period 
and decrease the fear of the nationals. Although the regulation is not an ideal means, it 
is still a positive way that could smooth the transition era. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The issue of CEEC migrations to the EU-15 is a continuous topic since the 
preparations of the 2004 enlargement. The thesis is focusing on the fears of the people 
in west members on the mass migration from the new members and its impact to the 
former.  
First, the CEEC migration is mostly economic motivated. In the peace era, the 
economic reasons are the most influential motivation of the migrants since they try to 
earn higher wages and therefore to improve their living standards. The larger the 
income gaps between different regions are, the more people will move to the place 
that could earn better living. The existing wage gap and the economic disparity 
between the old and new member states drive the CEEC workers move to the western 
countries. 
However, the CEEC migration is far less than what people expected. Migration 
is also a result of psychological gap since people are trying to get rid of the sense of 
relative deprivation to enhance their social classes. As a consequence, only the people 
who are extreme unsatisfied with their economic and psychological status will have 
the strong desire to migrant. It means only a few part of the whole population have the 
plan of pursuing new life, while others may be hesitate on the issue or not willing to 
do so at all. Given the economic gap between the two groups is shrinking and the 
sense of deprivation becomes meaningless, the migration in the past 5 years is 
moderate, unlike what was exaggerated before the enlargement.  
                                                        
32 Germany eases restrictions for new EU states, foreign students 
http://www.workpermit.com/news/2007-08-25/germany/germany-new-eu-engineers-allowed-to-work-graduates-th
ree-years.htm 
On the other hand, the CEEC migration is uneven distributed among EU-15. 
Germany as well as UK receive the most CEEC migrants. While to some other 
member states, the amount of eastern worker is so small that could have little impact 
to the labor market. It is the network of migrants and other elements including 
geography and culture etc. that make the asymmetrical distribution. 
The CEEC migration has economic and psychological impact simultaneously. In 
the economic aspect, the CEEC workers fill in the labor gap and propel the economy 
of EU-15 which are short of high skilled as well as low skilled labors. However, in the 
psychological perspective, it deteriorates the unbalance between the old and new 
members and increase the anxiety of the former. 
The study of the policy of Germany reveals that the country is facing the more 
economic and social problems than other members. The high unemployment rate and 
the immigration situation make Germany more cautious on the issue of migration and 
ease the regulation step by step. Even facing the challenges, Germany still open the 
door for the CEEC workers given the fulfillment of the restriction is moderate.  
It is common acknowledged that all the EU-15 members will benefit from the 
CEEC migration in a long term. However, the asymmetrical migrants will make the 
natives who are experiencing the high risk of unemployment more nervous and it is 
uneven to ask one country to afford the burden of enlargement. In fact, the pace of 
Germany is a little quicker than what people expected since the Germany government 
realizes that the need of more workers is getting more and more intense. Although the 
restriction still exists, it should be regarded as a means to adjust the labor market in 
Germany rather than a stubborn barrier.  
 
5.1 Further research 
 
Given the short nature of the thesis, it had to be rather compressed and many issues 
relevant to the subject of migration could not have been touched upon. If this subject 
could have been studied further and more in-depth, the practice of migration policy of 
Germany to the CEEC workers could be studied. Although announced as restriction, it 
is a question whether the regulation of Germany is strict fulfilled or not. 
When comparing the amount of CEEC migrants flow to Germany estimated by 
different measures, we will find the annual number is around 220000 (Turmann, 
2004)33 (Kelo & Wächter, 2004:P81). However, “in practice Germany has given as 
many people work as other big countries”, issued 500000 work permits to them from 
2004 to 200634. It is even a little more than what the previous research estimated (It is 
more than the CEEC workers in Germany mentioned above. Probably it is because 
some of the work permits are short term and some workers might quit their jobs 
before 2006.). What is the reason behind the phenomenon? 
To obtain a work permit in Germany, the employee should be at least well 
educated (Usually the employee must have a university degree or comparable 
qualification. For some positions there are special requirements)35. In practice, almost 
70 percent of the CEEC workers are highly educated or potential high skilled (Kelo & 
Wächter, 2004:P82). “Postponing the introduction of free movement has only a 
marginal impact on the scale of migration: postponing free movement for seven years 
will reduce initial migration by only a few thousand persons” (Alvarez-Plata et al., 
2003:P57). Additionally, besides the main stream means, there are other ways for the 
workers to get work permits, for instance by applying basis jobs with low salary. Thus 
it is rational to believe that the gate of Germany is open for most CEEC migrants in 
fact. Probably, most of the applicants are entitled with work permit and the restriction 
of Germany is only to pacify the public who are experiencing the long term 
unemployment and the fear of immigration. Certainly, the hypothesis should be tested 
by future research. 
Moreover, the Germany case also indicates that there might a combat between 
the west and eastern countries to attract more skilled workers. The importance of 
technique and knowledge is more and more realized by all the countries, which have 
various projects of pulling the people who possess skills. However, as a result of 
                                                        
33 Is Ignorance Really Bliss? Germany’s Labour Migration Policy, 
http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2004/migration/pt1/germanylabour 
34 EU free movement of labor map, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3513889.stm 
35 Basic Requirements to Qualify, http://www.workpermit.com/germany/requirements_for_work_permit.htm 
aging and population declining, the need of skilled workers and experts is common 
among all European countries. The opening of labor market in the EU-15 is to fulfill 
the responsibility of the Union on one hand; while on the other hand, it will lead to an 
intelligence flow to the west. As a response, the new member states also have their 
means to make them to be better destinations of skilled labors. The combat of skill 
reflects the weakness of the education and training system in the EU, in which the 
high unemployment and lack of labor co-exist. It will be discussed in another paper. 
Furthermore, it is a question to the EU if it is needed to enlarge further. The 
current candidates, Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey, and others that are pursuing EU 
membership, are all weaker economic and lower waged as well as dense populated. 
Among them, Turkey, which has a population of 68 million and made the effort of 
accession from 1980s, draws most of the concerns. It is a widely discussed to the 
EU-27 now if the accession of them will influence the labor market and the welfare 
system in the current members. The evaluation of the enlargement from the 
perspective of labor market will possibly influence the future development of the 
Union. What is more, it is argued that the most significant mission of the EU, which 
has a large body, in the first decades of the 21st century, is to reform the institutions in 
Brussels rather than to make it as large as possible. 
Appendix 1: The migration potential from the CEEC-10 to Germany (Fertig, 
2001:P718) 
year CEEC-10 First-Round Candidates 
 
medium 
convergence 
without free 
movement 
medium 
convergence 
with free 
movement 
No 
convergence 
with free 
movement 
medium 
convergence 
without 
free 
movement 
medium 
convergence 
with free 
movement 
No 
convergence 
with free 
movement 
1996 72827 76770 78430 35804 38150 39138 
1997 71931 75846 77493 35251 37576 38554 
1998 71283 75173 77202 34890 27199 38283 
1999 70636 74502 76545 34533 36826 38013 
2000 69995 73837 76069 34178 36455 37742 
2001 69361 73179 75596 33827 36087 37472 
2002 68736 72530 75127 33479 35723 37203 
2003 68118 71890 74662 33135 35363 36936 
2004 67509 71257 74200 32795 35007 36670 
2005 66907 70632 73741 32459 34655 36405 
2006 66312 70014 73285 32126 34307 36141 
2007 65725 69403 72831 31797 33962 35879 
2008 65144 68800 72381 31472 33622 35618 
2009 64571 68204 71933 31150 33284 35359 
2010 64004 67614 71488 30832 32950 35100 
2011 63444 67032 71046 30517 32620 34843 
2012 62890 66456 70607 30206 32293 34588 
2013 62343 65887 70170 29898 31970 34333 
2014 61803 65324 69737 29593 31650 34080 
2015 61269 64768 69306 29291 31334 33828 
Notes: CEEC-10 covers the following countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia. The first-round 
candidates are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland. For assumptions see 
next. 
Appendix 2: GDP growth rate of EU countries from 2000-2008 (based on the 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008) 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 0.831 0.857 1.214 2.309 2.043 3.302 3.439 1.894
Belgium 0.744 1.401 1.009 2.785 1.975 2.91 2.679 1.356
Denmark 0.705 0.466 0.384 2.296 2.459 3.903 1.82 1.174
Finland 2.636 1.643 1.774 3.728 2.841 4.853 4.399 2.43
France 1.854 1.027 1.087 2.47 1.711 1.989 1.883 1.369
Germany 1.239 0.011 -0.269 1.058 0.763 2.882 2.534 1.405
Greece 4.491 3.904 5.036 4.578 3.834 4.195 4 3.548
Republic of 
Ireland 5.908 6.43 4.33 4.273 5.923 5.735 5.28 1.752
Italy 1.822 0.458 -0.014 1.529 0.551 1.841 1.457 0.251
Luxembourg 2.517 4.105 2.097 4.876 5.022 6.118 5.366 3.083
Netherlands 1.926 0.076 0.336 2.237 1.51 3.005 3.458 2.146
Portugal 2.016 0.759 -0.805 1.516 0.91 1.343 1.892 1.3
Spain 3.645 2.704 3.098 3.267 3.62 3.857 3.825 1.815
Sweden 1.058 2.411 1.913 4.127 3.298 4.089 2.579 2
United 
Kingdom 2.372 2.053 2.77 3.259 1.839 2.909 3.12 1.63
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Bulgaria  4.066 4.483 5.007 6.642 6.246 6.322 6.167 5.5
Cyprus  3.986 2.102 1.907 4.199 3.949 4.044 4.365 3.4
Czech 
Republic 2.456 1.897 3.602 4.485 6.373 6.36 6.456 4.248
Estonia  7.663 8.016 7.24 8.256 10.155 11.188 7.111 3.02
Hungary  4.072 4.373 4.175 4.813 4.132 3.877 1.326 1.8
Latvia  8.041 6.476 7.195 8.676 10.599 11.925 10.243 3.624
Lithuania  6.645 6.917 10.316 7.32 7.937 7.663 8.773 6.5
Malta  -1.613 2.617 -0.307 0.24 3.353 3.43 3.776 2.171
Poland  1.205 1.444 3.867 5.344 3.617 6.249 6.52 4.927
Romania  5.745 5.12 5.224 8.4 4.1 7.9 6 5.4
Slovak 
Republic 3.395 4.763 4.765 5.209 6.565 8.536 10.368 6.615
Slovenia  3.102 3.656 2.814 4.444 4.145 5.719 6.066 4.11
 
Appendix 3: Resident working age population by nationality, 2005, in per cent of 
total (Source: Eurostat, Labour force survey 1st quarter 2005 (Ireland 2nd quarter 
2005))36
 National EU-15 EU-10 Non-EU 
Belgium 91.3 5.8 0.2 2.8 
Denmark 96.4 1.1 N/a 2.4 
Germany 89.5 2.8 0.7 7 
Greece 94 0.3 0.4 5.3 
Spain 90.5 1.2 0.2 8.1 
France 94.4 1.9 0.1 3.6 
Ireland 92.3 3 2 2.8 
Luxembourg 57.9 37.6 0.3 4.2 
Netherlands 95.7 1.4 0.1 2.8 
Austria 89.2 1.9 1.4 7.5 
Portugal 97 0.4 N/a 2.6 
Finland 98.3 0.4 0.3 1 
Sweden 94.8 2.3 0.2 2.7 
UK 93.8 1.7 0.4 4.1 
EU15 92.4 2.1 0.4 5.1 
                                                        
36 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/273/27306.htm 
Executive Summary 
 
The thesis concentrates on the internal migration of the European Union (EU) after 
the most resent enlargement in 2004 and 2007, which entitled 12 new member states 
into the Union. It is a descriptive and explanatory analysis of the influence of the 
migration from the central and eastern European countries (CEEC) to the EU-15. The 
thesis starts off by introducing the theories of global migration since the European 
migration discussed in this paper is also a part of the global trend. The theoretical 
analysis is to find a general model of migration which will be applied to the situation 
in the EU as well.  
The thesis uses the theories to answer two basic questions of most migrants when 
they are facing the choice of migration, which is the result of the interaction of a 
series of power: why to migrate and where to move. First, in the contemporary world, 
the economic elements become the most prominent impetus of the human migration 
and the economic motivated migrants consist of most proportion of global wave. The 
neoclassical migration theory indicates that people will flow to the region where they 
could get higher wages and better living condition. When comparing the host and 
home countries, the individuals will choose the one that could maximum their 
personal value. Whereas, the new economic migration theory notes besides the 
economic reasons, the migrants are also motivated by the psychological factors, 
which means to escape from the sense of relative deprivation and enhance the social 
class of their families in the hometown. Thus the migration is not only decided by the 
economic situation, but also by the social condition. The migration trend will depend 
on the structure of a society, in which the people who are not satisfied with their 
living as well as social condition are most pro-migration, while the opposite party is 
the least. It means that the definite migrants are only a portion of a community, while 
most people, who are between the two poles, will hesitate. In a relative stable society, 
the migration will be mild. 
Second, when facing the options of destination, migrants will choose the one 
where they could find more conveniences. The network theory indicates that the 
existing network in one country will attract more migration and consequently it forms 
a snowball effect. The individuals who have already moved abroad will keep 
connections with their families and friends in their home countries. They will become 
the bridge of the new comers and offer helps to them. The countries that have a 
network will be a determinate element that will largely influence the individuals’ 
choice. On the other hand, other conveniences, including the distance, which will 
affect the transportation cost in the first migration, the culture and language, and the 
migration policy of the host country will also be taken into account when the migrants 
are make the decision of move. As a consequence, they will flow to the countries that 
have better economy and offer them more conveniences, while the desire of moving 
to the ones that have worse economy and fewer conveniences will be relative low. In 
practice, the migration distribution is asymmetrical since the former will receive most 
migrants. 
When studying the situation in the EU, we will find the economic disparity and 
wage gap between the east and west countries will be the most significant element 
that will drive the people from the CEEC move to the west. However, the rapid 
developing economy of the new member states will convince more people to stay at 
home and enjoy the low cost living. On the other hand, the accession of the EU 
enhanced the status of the CEEC in the international community. It led to a decreasing 
trend of relative deprivation since the migration to the west countries has few 
influence in improving their social class in that the new ones are equal to the old 
member states in principle. It means that the CEEC are generally stable in society and 
have a positive economic development, which deduces the desire of their nationals to 
leave home. Consequently, the migration trend from the eastern members is moderate 
and has a trend of decline year after year.  
On the other hand, the employment status of the CEEC workers in their new 
destination is depressing. Although most of them are well educated, they working 
status are mostly under their expectation. A large number of them are working under 
their qualification. Especially in the shock of the financial crisis, numerous CEEC 
workers flow back to their home countries, where is also experiencing the lack of 
labor. When calculating the migration flow forth and back, we will find the amount of 
migrants is far less than what people expected and the fear of mass migration is 
exaggerated. In fact, they have more positive effect on the labor market of the EU-15. 
Filling the labor gap, enhancing the competence of the native labors are the most 
significant influences.  
However, even the Commission urged the EU-15 to open their labor market 
completely as soon as possible, the member states are not willing to do so. In the first 
round, only 3 countries are completely open to the CEEC workers from 2004, while 
some others abolished the barrier gradually in the next years. By 2009, Austria and 
Germany are the last ones that still have restrictions on the CEEC labors. The thesis 
argues it is the asymmetry of the migration that influenced the decision of the EU-15 
on labor market. In the past 5 years, most of them flowed to UK and Germany. 
Although Germany is one of the countries that have the strictest regulation on the 
eastern migration, it still received almost 1/3 of the migrants because of its economic 
charm, the geographic convenience and the existing large groups of network from the 
CEEC. While to others, the CEEC workers are too few to impact their labor market. 
No wonder the latter gave up the barrier, it is because some countries afford most of 
the pressure. 
The thesis then studies the case of Germany to explore the reason why it still 
insists on the restriction policy. The author argues that the unemployment situation 
might be the most serious obstacle that block Germany from opening up its labor 
market. In the last years, the unemployment rate in Germany kept ranking among the 
top list throughout the EU. What is more, taking into account the largest population, 
the unemployed worker there is the most in the Union. Moreover, the uneven 
distribution of unemployment, especially in the eastern part, also puzzles the 
governments. It leads to a less pro-EU wave and a right turn in politics since people 
are more self-protected. 
Furthermore, the alarm of brain drain to Germany is getting more and more 
serious. A number of German, most of which are young and skilled, emigrant to other 
countries. Unfortunately, the number increase annually. However, although Germany 
received most migrants in the EU, most of them are not high qualified. It may lead to 
a deformation of the labor structure: the upper half (skilled and experts) is becoming 
smaller, while the lower half (low skilled) is expanding. It will harm the economy of 
the whole country, which is eager to the skilled worker but less attractive to them. 
That is the most serious threat to Germany to some extent.  
Germany, whereas, still eased its regulation on the CEEC workers step by step 
even facing the problems. It is hopefully that the unfinished enlargement will be 
completed in the near future.  
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